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The Manuscript Found in Saragossa abounds in instances of seduction. 
Accordingly, the object of this essay will be to demonstrate how the 
novel unfolds its seductive potential. But seduction is a gradual process 
which consists in a subtle play (a kind of jouissance, a joyous play that 
promises bliss, victory and fulfilment) of magnetic influences; it is an 
art to be practised by those who are patient and sanguine at the same 
time. For this reason we will first have to explore the ecological factors 
that are conducive to the inception and progression of emotional 
transformations which Alphonse van Worden undergoes in the course 
of his sojourn in the Alpujarras. Then, by a painstaking reconstruction 
and reinterpretation of some key experiences which he goes through - 
which are, in point of fact, artfully inflicted upon him by those 
responsible for leading him astray - we will, hopefully, gain an insight 
into the true nature of his ambiguous predicament. Finally, we shall 
discover the intricate pattern of seduction which underlies the two 
major epistemological figures Alphonse’s seductors personify, namely 
truth and illusion.1
1 According to Jean Baudrilllard, seduction by definition involves a dynamic relationship 
to truth: “To be seduced is to be diverted from one’s truth. To seduce is to divert the other 
from his truth. This truth then becomes the secret that escapes him”. Jean Baudrillard, 
“On Seduction”, in Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings (Stanford: California University 
Press, 1988), p. 160.
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I will argue that it is precisely the impossibility of distinguishing 
truth from illusion that generates seductive energy in the course of 
Alphonse’s meandering journey to Madrid. His protracted stay in the 
Alpujarras will be seen as resulting from his suspension in between 
two orders: that of reality and that of fantasy. The suspension is 
effected by the first seductive episode which terminates under the 
gallows of Zoto’s brothers. The gallows itself is a visible, excessively 
literal figure of this suspension but Alphonse’s confrontation with 
the foul corpses of Zoto’s brothers is merely a consequence of another 
truly seductive tryst. What seduces him is, in fact, an interplay of 
truth and illusion, their kaleidoscopic substitutions and enchanting 
interchangeability. Can there be anything more beguiling than a 
concurrence of truth which is veiled in the appearance of illusion with 
illusion in the guise of truth?
When does Alphonse’s original seduction take place then? 
Certainly not under the gallows for it is a most unsuitable location, 
and the company definitely lack charm and allurement. Seduction 
prefers interiors, cosy rooms and candlelight; understatement in 
terms of scenery and circumstance. It is in the Venta Quemada that 
Alphonse receives an invitation to join the play of truths and illusions, 
to attend a spectacle of delirious story-telling which leads up to an 
equally delirious (and oneiric) love-making with its anticlimax by the 
side of Zoto’s brothers. The two succubi who captivate his attention 
for the period between the stroke of twelve and the first cock crow 
invite him to a separate chamber which then turns out to be another 
nocturnal hallucination and leaves him with the impression akin to 
that which theatregoers are well familiar with: once the performance 
is over, there is no coming back to the fictive universe that actors 
conjured up for the duration of one magic night only. The impression 
is too strong to be unreal. And yet he can plainly see that reality will 
never accomodate his wish to go on living the enthralling fiction, the 
fiction which is woven out of illusive cues given by Emina and 
Zubeida, the two leading actresses who, clad in seductive exotic 
costumes, perform live for their sole spectator.
There is, too, something overly dramatic about Alphonse’s choice 
of the more perilous route to Madrid. No doubt, by obeying the 
sacred laws of honour, which prescribe that he should brave every 
available danger, he wants to dramatise his own person at the outset
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of the journey. That is his way of parrying the reservations made by 
the innkeeper at Andujar who takes notice of Alphonse’s young age 
and lack of experience.2 As it soon turns out, van Worden’s code of 
values is modelled on that of his father whose punctiliousness about 
matters of honour verged on the comic. By adopting his father’s 
extravagant mode of settling questions of honour, Alphonse 
inadvertently follows in the footsteps of such hyperbolic figures as 
Don Quixote or Roland, the legendary nephew of Charlemagne. 
Nevertheless, his courage is also a ticket to the feast prepared for the 
bold soldier by the two Moorish beauties.3 Unruffled by ill 
forebodings that accompany his arrival at the Venta Quemada and 
weird inscriptions that guard its gates, Alphonse enters the inn with a 
firm resolve not to show any signs of fear. But in fact he is troubled 
by doubts whether ghosts occupy that bizarre hostelry, and he does 
sense something out of the way about its appearance and location.
2 Cf. Jan Potocki, The Manuscript Found in Saragossa (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1996), p. 6.
3 Cf. ibid., p. 15.
4 Interestingly, in Latin, hostis means also a stranger.
Like the gates of Hades, the Venta Quemada is a Magic Door which 
demands an “open sesame” before it yields up its treasures to a 
reckless adventurer. It is also a symbolic boundary of the territory 
under the rule of two charming spirits. The moment he leaves behind 
the relatively sober reality of the valley of Los Hermanos and enters 
the hostelry, Alphonse starts undergoing a rite of passage meant to 
test his courage and integrity. Surprisingly, the hostelry he visits is 
hostless: the inn-keeper has forsaken it, thus rendering the Venta 
hostile rather than hospitable to strangers.4 Consequently, it is 
Alphonse who runs the risk of becoming its new host in the sense of 
Latin hostia, i.e., an animal which is offered as sacrifice to appease 
the wrath of gods. The inn’s reputation for being haunted by demons 
is accordingly justified by its semi-religious function: as a temple of 
sorts it is a meeting ground where people’s transactions with spirits 
can take place. Alphonse’s nocturnal episode in the Venta Quemada 
will therefore be governed by the interlaced codes of the real and the 
transcendent, the rational and the supernatural.
The transcendent aspect of Alphonse’s exeperience merits 
particular consideration. It is certainly possible to explain away the 
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miraculous happenings in the inn through recourse to magic or 
witchcraft. And yet the supernatural is commonly defined in 
opposition to the real whilst Alphonse’s sense of reality is temporarily 
suspended and he is invited to pay a visit to a parallel universe which 
is complete in itself and does not come in conflict with the reality 
outside the inn. This infinitely subterranean universe may defy the 
laws of physics but it is so illusive that in broad daylight Alphonse is 
prone to blame all the night’s dealings with spirits on his own 
hallucinations and nightmarish visions.5 It is not by accident that he 
awakens in the open, far away from the hostelry which saw his descent 
into the delirious world of enchanting tales and tempting gestures. 
No doubt, his return to reality is abrupt and painful. And yet he does 
realise that there can be no direct commerce between the two zones. 
Whatever is going on “for real” requires that he should forget about 
his exotic companions and thus keep the promise that he has made 
them. Conversely, for the duration of his amorous encounters with 
Emina and Zubeida, he is obliged to leave behind all his earthly 
commitments and abandon himself to their seductive charm.
5 Cf. J. Potocki, The Manuscript..p. 34.
He is not unaware of their overwhelming power to allure and ensnare 
their prey, to be sure. Brought up as a Catholic, Alphonse must be 
well versed in the art of identifying a large variety of evil spirits: in 
no time at all does he reach the conclusion that the two charming 
girls belong to the species of succubi, that is they are demons in the 
guise of beautiful women bent on seducing sleeping men with 
the intention of having a carnal intercourse with their victims. All 
the evidence that Alphonse can amass seems to corroborate that: 
the girls are more beautiful than other women he met; their charm 
is irresistible; finally, there is something diabolical about their 
determination to cast their spell on the young soldier and possibly 
make him recant his religion. Their sly manoeuvres, the nocturnal 
setting they choose for their appearance, the secrecy they insist 
upon - all those suspicious circumstances immediately alert the young 
officer. Furthermore, by revealing that they are his close relatives, the 
Moorish beauties evidently hint at the possibility of introducing some 
incestuous overtones into the relationship with their cousin. It is all 
the more surprising, then, that he eventually succumbs to their 
temptation.
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In order to account for his acquiescence in his own seduction it 
might be necessary to assume that it is actually Alphonse van Worden 
who toys with his seducers. Or, possibly, he reposes complete 
confidence in his own power to keep a tight rein on the progress of 
his oneiric amours. The state of Alphonse’s heart and mind is aptly 
conveyed by Roland Barthes in the following description of the 
amorous subject’s readiness to experience ravishment: “The hypnotic 
episode [i.e., ravishment], it is said, is ordinarily preceded by a twilight 
state: the subject is in a sense empty, available, offered unwittingly to 
the rape which will surprise him”.6 7By way of specifying his point, 
Barthes offers a telling illustration: “I never fall in love unless I have 
wanted to; the emptiness I produce in myself (and on which, like 
Werther, quite innocently, I pride myself) is nothing but that interval, 
longer or shorter, when I glance around me, without seeming to, 
looking for who to love”.'’ Apparently, what we can identify here is a 
predisposition towards being captivated, a kind of tacit agreement to 
being implicated in an amorous adventure.
6 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 190.
7 Ibid., p. 190.
Enchanted as he is, Alphonse perceives the Moorish girls as too 
beautiful to mean any harm. Their manners are impeccable and their 
declarations sound ardent and convincing. Alphonse’s suspicions are 
thus lulled to sleep and he lends his ear to the story they are about to 
tell him. Strategically, this is one of the crucial points in the book: the 
tale (whether true or fictive is another matter) narrated by Zubeida is 
like the first domino piece which triggers a series of further narratives. 
Up till the end of the novel Alphonse is under this spell of story-telling; 
for the most part of the book he listens to other characters’ accounts 
though he is also obliged to give an account of himself while enjoying 
the hospitability of a hermit. The two months he spends in the 
Alpujarras abound in personal narratives to the effect that few “real” 
incidents of consequence are recorded by van Worden. On leave 
from his duties, the young caballero seems to be living out a fantasy 
concocted by someone else’s wayward imagination.
The seductive sisters, having been assigned the roles of masters of 
ceremony, introduce Alphonse into the magic world of story-telling. The 
personal narratives which make up the bulk of The Manuscript are an 
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extraordinary mixture of fact and fiction: allegedly true, they all involve 
some explicitly fictive effects, i.e., emplotment of events, selection and 
dramatisation of incidents, magnification of many a protagonist’s 
qualities. However, the young soldier takes the narratives at face value. 
He is led to turn a blind eye to their rhetoric under the influence of their 
seductive charm which consists in a crafty combination of truth and 
illusion. This is precisely what Emina and Zubeida are responsible for: 
they are to make Alphonse lose sight of the tenuous border-line which 
separates reality from fantasy. The girls themselves become but two 
rhetorical figures whose function is confined to enticing Alphonse into 
relying on the truth-value of the stories he is told by other characters.
The Story of a Demonic Philosopher 
Who Wanted to Redefine Truth and Reality
It is high time to acknowledge that the inspiration for identifying 
woman with truth, and truth with woman, comes from the writings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche. The German philosopher, who never married 
(though he did propose to Lou Salomé) and often spoke and wrote 
disparagingly even of his own mother and sister,8 conceived of 
femininity as metaphor on a number of occasions. However, what 
seems to be a particularly persistent association in his works is the 
metaphoric conflation of truth and woman.9 One passage, included in 
the Preface for the second edition of The Gay Science, is particularly 
illuminating in our context: “Perhaps truth is a woman who has her 
reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is - to 
speak Greek - BauboT’10 Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that truth is very much like Baubo, the mythical archetype of female 
8 Cf., e.g. Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is (Har- 
mondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 41.
9 I shall refrain here from enumerating all the relevant passages in Nietzsche’s texts, 
some of which will be discussed further on in this essay. Instead, I suggest that the reader 
consult by far the most insightful discussion of the issue in question to be found in Jacques 
Derrida, “The Question of Style”, in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of 
Interpretation, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell Publishing, 1977), pp. 176-189.
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1974), p. 38.
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sexuality and licentiousness who, through merriment and dance, 
managed to cheer up Demeter when the goddess despaired of the 
loss of her daughter. Thus, Baubo helped restore fertility to the world 
and ever since has been duly extolled by women. Interestingly, 
according to the Oxford Classical Dictionary, Baubo was originally a 
demonic personification of the female genitals.
Dance, amusement, demonic promiscuity - one cannot help 
recalling the first night Alphonse spent with Emina and Zubeida in 
the Venta Quemada. But why is it specifically Baubo that Nietzsche 
associates with truth? Why should truth have a feminine nature? 
What is it about truth that invites such comparisons? In order to 
answer those questions we will have to examine major attempts at 
defining truth and find out how they relate to Nietzsche’s approach 
to this issue. That will also involve a re-evaluation of the concept of 
reality, or the real world, which, according to Nietzsche, is part of the 
Platonic legacy and as such must be exposed and deconstructed.
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche concedes that truth has a lot 
of girlish charm about it.11 Moreover, he acknowledges implicitly that 
it must have undergone some transformations, and, most likely, will 
continue developing in a direction which may displease its “suitors”. 
The young beautiful girl will grow into a mature lady who, in turn, 
will become a scowling old woman. This makes Nietzsche conclude 
that, in fact, her charm is in continual decline. In time the power of 
attraction that she exerts will diminish and those who are under her 
spell may turn to her rivals: untruth, error, illusion, falsehood, 
appearance. In a characteristically allegorical fashion, Nietzsche 
smuggles in a profound truth about truth itself: the truth that truth 
has had its own history and has been relative to fluctuating 
epistemological paradigms. No doubt, this is his way of anticipating 
another major shift which will soon affect our attitude to truth. Its 
anthropomorphic presentation is certainly meant to alert us to its 
wayward and mutable nature. As femininity incarnate, she can hardly 
be defined and controlled by all those who want to found their views 
on her dogmatic stability and reliability. As a young woman, she is 
irresistibly attractive and seductively unapproachable. That is 
11 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. 
R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 121 (section 257).
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probably the reason why men have always fantasized about her 
without ever winning her favours.
Those fantasies have often taken the formal shape of a theory of 
truth. Among the most widely accepted accounts of truth is the so- 
called correspondence theory. In a nutshell, it says that those 
statements and beliefs are true which correspond to brute facts. Thus 
it assumes a relationship between our linguistic practice and the actual 
world which is supposed to be represented by the true enunciations we 
produce. Interestingly, in this theory, truth is reduced to its discursive 
aspect: its major proponents, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, speak 
of beliefs and propositions which are either true or false.12 Even if we 
extend the applicability of this theory to all kinds of representations - 
in fact, what Wittgenstein puts forward in the Tractatus can be described 
as the picture theory of truth13 - we come up against some serious 
problems. Not only does this theory presuppose some indisputable 
definition of facts and reality but it also takes for granted the possibility 
of mirroring brute facts in language. Without this assumption, what 
we obtain are two incongruous elements which belong to two 
incommensurable systems.
12 For a thorough presentation of all the major theories of truth to date, I am indebted to 
Lawrence E. Johnson, Focusing on Truth (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), passim.
13 Cf. ibid., p. 50.
14 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Antichrist, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 50-51.
15 In The Will to Power, Nietzsche dismantles the very opposition between the “true” and 
“apparent” world by arguing that, in fact, “the first is a mere fiction, constructed of fictitious 
entities” whereas appearance itself “belongs to reality: it is a form of its being”. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 306 (section 568).
Nietzsche seems to have anticipated the aporias inherent in that 
theory. In the section of Twilight of the Idols entitled “How ‘the Real 
World’ at last Became a Myth”, he describes what he himself calls 
“history of an error”.14 It is an allegorical overview of how the real 
world gradually became unattainable and left in its wake merely its 
own useless idea. If we read this section in conjunction with the 
immediately preceding ones, we find out that the basic claim Nietzsche 
makes is that the so called “real world” is just an abstract notion very 
much like “the apparent world” with which it is traditionally 
contrasted.15 It may be a purely nominal confusion but in the final 
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analysis every definition resorts to some kind of nominalism. Of 
course, the corresponence definition of truth is no exception.
The assumption of a relationship between things and words, 
between particular facts and statements of those facts, is also subject 
to Nietzsche’s ebullient critique. In “On Truth and Falsity in their 
Ultramoral Sense”, an essay written in 1873 (that is well before 
Human, All Too Human), he notes that every word relies on an idea 
which, in turn, by failing to do justice to each particular thing’s unique 
and inimitable qualities, misrepresents the things it is supposed to 
stand for.16 To put it in a more technical way, words tend to 
overgeneralise their referents. The incommensurability of language 
and reality is additionaly emphasised in a celebrated passage from 
Human, All Too Human'.
16 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense”, in 
The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Oscar Levy, ed., vol. II: Early Greek Philosophy 
and Other Essays (London: Allen and Unwin, 1924), pp. 177-180.
17 F. Nietzsche, Human..., p. 16 (section 11).
The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, 
that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other 
world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could 
lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it. To 
the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and 
names of things as in aetemae veritates he has appropriated to 
himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he 
really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the 
world.17
Eventually, nothing fundamentally true or false can be said of the 
real world: some of our beliefs, statements and propositions may give 
a convincing expression to certain aspects of extralinguistic reality 
but on the whole the two realms do not translate into each other. 
That obviously plays havoc with the entire correspondence theory of 
truth which Nietzsche had demolished even before it was developed 
by Russell and Wittgenstein.
Another major theory of truth is associated exclusively with things 
mental. Its detachment from brute facts must be seen in a larger 
perspective of the views which have been espoused by the proponents 
of the idealist philosophy. As an integral component of the idealist 
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metaphysics, the coherence theory of truth is based on the contention 
that “the degree of truth in a particular proposition is to be judged in 
the first instance by its coherence with experience as a whole”.18 In 
other words, we can define as true what coheres with all the previous 
beliefs that we have taken to be true. The new proposition, then, 
must be in conformance with a general body of truths which make up 
a coherent system. The idealist assumption that at bottom such a 
system is premised on the Truth which gives rise to all the other 
“minor” truths prevents truth as such from being relative to one’s 
individual experience of reality. But the problem with this theory is 
that there may be more than one coherent system.19 We may be faced 
with a choice of several different seemingly coherent systems which 
are incompatible: at this point a coherentist will need a criterion which 
is anterior to those systems, one that transcends them altogether. 
But, as Nietzsche points out in the context of his discussion of science 
as a metaphysical system, such a criterion is always a matter of our 
arbitrary choice because “there is absolutely no science ‘without 
presuppositions’, the very idea is inconceivable, paralogical: a 
philosophy, a ‘belief’ must always exist first in order for science to 
derive from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to 
existence”.20 Apparently, once we have accepted a system of truths, it 
is easy to verify each new proposition, but the system itself, premised 
as it is on a mere “belief”, an unverifiable presupposition, will never 
be absolutely true.
18 B. Blanshard, “The Nature of Thought”, quoted in L. E. Johnson, Focusing..., 
p. 18.
19 Cf. L. E. Johnson, Focusing..., pp. 27-28.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 127.
21 Because of the limited scope of this essay, I have focused only on selected conceptions 
of truth (those particularly relevant to Nietzsche’s views) but the reader should bear in 
mind that there are many other theories of truth in the field including Tarski’s semantic 
theory of truth, the redundancy theory of truth and the performative theory of truth, to 
name just a few.
22 L. E. Johnson, Focusing..., p. 64.
Out of a variety of truth theories,21 the pragmatic conception of 
truth seems to be the closest to Nietzsche’s views. Pragmatists take 
truth as “being a matter of fitting in with practice”.22 Accordingly, 
they designate as true those ideas and beliefs which we can verify and 
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assimilate: eventually, what matters about truth is its “cash-value in 
experiential terms”.23 William James argues that, in fact, the truth of 
an idea is relative to our ends because truth does not reside inherently 
in the idea but happens to it.24 It must be added, however, that 
pragmatists encourage us to see as true those beliefs which might 
work out well over the generality of our experience, that is, those 
which might retain their epistemological qualification in every context. 
Undoubtedly, on this account, truth is radically subjective but at least 
it is tied to our cognition without which there could not be true or 
false statements.
23 William James, Pragmatism (New York: Dover Publications, 1995), p. 77.
24 Cf. ibid., p. 77.
25 Cf. F. Nietzsche, The Will...,p. 249 (section 455).
26 Ibid., p. 249 (section 455). See also F. Nietzsche, “On Truth and Falsity...”, pp. 177 
and 181.
27 Ibid., pp. 249-250 (section 455).
28 William James defines “the true” along the following lines: ‘“The true', to put it very 
briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the 
expedient in the way of our behaving”. W. James, Pragmatism..., p. 86 (italics supplied by 
James).
On closer inspection, however, the pragmatist theory of truth 
entails what Nietzsche terms “psychological confusions”.25 In a telling 
passage from The Will to Power, Nietzsche asserts that what people 
have mistaken for truth is belief in it rather than truth itself.26 Our 
“will to truth” results from a confusion between what we want to be 
true and what can be true; we find it extremely difficult to come to 
terms with a truth which is painful or harmful to us. All that makes 
Nietzsche reach the following conclusion:
How is truth proved? By the feeling of enhanced power - by 
utility - by indispensability - in short, by advantages (namely 
presuppositions concerning what truth ought to be like for us to 
recognize it). But that is a prejudice: a sign that truth is not involved 
at all.27
The pragmatist collocation of truth and expedience28 is, according to 
Nietzsche, an instance of wishful thinking with regard to truth. Veritas 
and utilitas would certainly make a splendid couple but their marriage 
would only give expression to our instrumental imposition of truth 
upon whatever we find advantageous to our projects. That, in the 
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long run, such an approach to truth would also pave the way for its 
ideological/political abuse is an obvious corollary of the entire 
argument though Nietzsche seems to be more interested in the 
reasons why we need truth at all.
The will to truth, alongside the will to power, is one of Nietzsche’s 
central concerns. On a number of occasions it acquires the status of 
an ethical problem: “The will to truth requires critique - let us define 
our own task in this way - the value of truth must for once, by way of 
experiment, be called into question (.. ,)”.29 The experiment Nietzsche 
proposes consists in a re-examination of the origins of our 
unconditional will to truth. Based on the contention that nothing is 
unconditional, his efforts to undermine the antithesis of truth and 
illusion involve a suspicious scrutiny of the conditions which gave rise 
to “the tyranny of the true”. The results of that scrutiny are presented 
in section 344 of The Gay Science: the indisputable value of truth is a 
matter of a metaphysical faith, “a faith that is thousands of years old, 
that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the 
truth, that truth is divine”.30 By way of demonstrating how relative a 
faith like that can be, Nietzsche hastens to ask: “But what if this 
should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to 
be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie - if God 
himself should prove to be our most enduring lie?”31
29 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy..., p. 128.
30 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science..., p. 283 (section 344).
31 Ibid., p. 283 (section 344).
32 Cf. F. Nietzsche, “On Truth and Falsity...”, p. 180 where truths are defined as 
illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions.
Apparently, even if what we take to be our truths are, in fact, lies 
and illusions,32 we must allow them to seduce us into believing that 
they are true. That might explain a great deal with regard to Alphonse 
van Worden’s willingness to be misled by his seductresses: once we 
deny truth its ethical prerogatives, there is no reason why we should 
guard ourselves against untruth. But, in his writings, Nietzsche does 
not content himself with demystifying the illusive quality of truth as 
such; he also emphasises that we had better remain in the dark about 
the “true” nature of truth and illusion. Or, to put it in a different 
way, in the name of our survival we must posit as true (and 
subsequently forget that we have done so) whatever proves to be 
Demonie Seduction... 97
useful for life, whatever enhances the feeling of power.33 In 
consequence, deception, simulation and illusion, if veiled in the 
appearance of truth, will not be stigmatised but extolled as life’s 
fundamental instruments whose role is to sustain and perpetuate life 
itself. It might seem that we are back to the pragmatist theory of 
truth, and that it has returned with a vengeance. And yet Nietzsche’s 
argument, dispersed as it is over his copious writings, involves one 
major modification: what he encourages us to believe in is not “true 
truth” but its mere semblance, a simulacrum of truth, its delusive 
surrogate. No longer an antithesis of illusive appearance but rather 
its twin sister - Baubo alias Emina; Baubo alias Zubeida.
33 Cf. F. Nietzsche, The Will..., p. 290 (section 534).
34 This is, in fact, one of the major meanings of the verb “seduce” that The Oxford 
English Dictionary gives.
7 - Under the Gallows...
The Story of Alphonse van Worden's Demonic 
Seduction Continued
The progress of Alphonse’s seduction must be reconstructed with 
military precision. Once in the Alpujarras, the Walloon officer, who is 
supposed to be on his way to Madrid to join the Spanish army, keeps 
loitering for more than two months. Temporarily relieved of his 
military obligations, he is seduced also in the sense that he is persuaded 
to desert his allegiance to the army.34 His inadvertent desertion, 
however, does not seem to be much of an ordeal. Conscientious as he 
is, the young soldier indulges freely in his diversions: torn between the 
reality principle (represented by his military duties) and the pleasure 
principle (represented explicitly by Emina and Zubeida and implicitly 
by the phantasmic universe they invite him to), he does not scruple to 
choose the latter. The sensation of being overpowered by the 
supernatural which he experiences is thus a way of rationalising his 
own willing suspension of disbelief in the fictive, a lame excuse for 
abandoning himself to the seductive phantasmagoria.
As an object of seduction, Alphonse is subjected to the economy of 
illusive attractions and seductive illusions. But, were we to rely on 
Robert Meister’s foreword to A Literary Guide to Seduction - a text 
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which boasts of its own pioneering role in terms of unpacking the 
theoretical intricacies of seductive mechanisms - we should dismiss 
the notion of attraction altogether. Meister insists that “the first 
postulate in the dogma of seduction is the absence of mutual 
attraction”.35 Naturally, to arouse attraction is the chief object of 
seductive maneuvres. But, apparently, attraction does not come into 
play on the level of the seducer’s motivations. Here, however, Meister 
does not seem to be quite consistent for, having introduced a 
distinction between “angelic” and “satanic” seduction, he argues that 
the angelic seducer must be motivated by love,36 which is, after all, a 
kind of powerful attraction. Problems start piling up when he ascribes 
sincerity to the angelic type of seducer while, as we all know, seduction 
by definition involves anything but sincerity, which is reserved for 
courtship. Alphonse’s seduction is thus neither angelic nor satanic; it 
is fundamentally, and demonically, discursive.
35 Robert Meister, ed.,/1 Literary Guide to Seduction (London: Elek Books, 1964), 
p. 16.
36 Ibid., p. 17.
37 J. Baudrillard, “On Seduction...”, p. 150.
The demonic succubi who seduce Alphonse are first and foremost 
demons of language. The young officer succumbs to the discourse 
they use to enchant him, but also, and perhaps in equal measure, to 
his own discourse which he projects onto his amorous encounters 
with Emina and Zubeida. Alphonse’s efforts to interpret - that is, to 
get at the truth of - the figures who (which) seduce him eventuates in 
his falling prey to the inevitable seduction of his own discourse:
Every interpretive discourse (discours de sens) wants to get beyond 
appearances', this is its illusion and fraud. But getting beyond 
appearances is an impossible task: inevitably every discourse is 
revealed in its own appearance, and is hence subject to the stakes 
imposed by seduction, and consequently to its own failure as 
discourse. Perhaps every discourse is secretly tempted by this failure 
and by having its objectives put into question, changing its truth 
effects into surface effects which act like a mirror absorbing and 
engulfing meaning. This is what happens initially when a discourse 
seduces itself; the original way in which it absorbs meaning and 
empties itself of meaning in order to better fascinate others: the 
primitive seduction of language.37
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The primitive seduction of language insinuates itself into Alphonse’s 
perception of the two exotic beauties who appear to be bent on 
making him relinquish his integrity as well as his military and religious 
loyalties. Although it is true that the women refrain from dispelling 
his doubts, we must also concede that they are just content to observe 
how Alphonse seduces himself into believing that he is being seduced.38 
Emina and Zubeida are quite simply projections of his own idea of 
seduction: they come from what Roland Barthes calls the amorous 
“Image-repertoire”,39 and, at most, they testify to Alphonse’s 
willingness to be led astray.
38 Again, this self-reflexive momentum is in perfect conformity with Baudrillard’s idea 
of seduction: “Is it seducing, or being seduced, that is seductive? Yet being seduced is still 
the best way of seducing. It is an endless strophe. There is no active or passive in seduction, 
no subject or object, or even interior or exterior: it plays on both sides of the border with 
no border separating the sides. No one can seduce another if they have not been seduced 
themselves”. J. Baudrillard, “On Seduction. p. 160.
39 Cf. R. Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse..., passim.
40 Alphonse himself identifies both girls with illusions cherished and literally caressed 
in his dreams. Cf. J. Potocki, The Manuscript. p. 23.
The two Moorish beauties are figures of transition and initiation. 
They herald the transition from the order of reality to that of fantasy 
(or fiction), but they are also responsible for initiating Alphonse into 
their own epistemology, with its blurred distinction between truth and 
illusion. Initially, there is every indication that Emina and Zubeida can 
hardly be other than demonic hallucinations, illusions meant to confuse 
Alphonse’s sense of reality.40 They are pregnant with “supernatural” 
significations which van Worden is quick to apprehend; eventually, they 
turn out to be pregnant with “real” meanings in the shape of Alphonse’s 
children. A peculiar mixture of candour and cunning, they do not lie to 
their cousin, and yet neither do they try to lead him out of error. Emina 
and Zubeida are seductive figures precisely to the extent that they 
refuse to identify their own status as true or illusive. Instead, they let 
Alphonse speculate and draw conclusions grounded on his own 
suspicions and expectations. Thereby he assumes the role of the agent 
of his own seduction, prompted by his own imagination to believe in 
the illusive nature of the Moorish beauties.
Emina and Zubeida are pregnant with literary significations, too. 
The two exotic Muslims are modelled on Scheherazade whose gift for 
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story-telling was truly miraculous. And it is primarily as story-tellers 
that the Moorish girls convey an important message: the plot they 
implicate Alphonse in is neither entirely true nor completely fictive. 
By undermining the tenuous distinction between truth and illusion, 
they introduce Alphonse straight to the heart of the most seductive 
truth, the Nietzschean truth that there is no truth outside language, 
and language is always, and by definition, illusively metaphoric. Like 
in every story van Worden is told in the Alpujarras, truth and fantasy 
intermingle for they are twin sisters whose illusive charm and 
seductiveness are truly irresistible.
Leszek Drong
Demoniczne uwodzenie: nietzscheańska interpretacja Rękopisu 
znalezionego w Saragossie Jana Potockiego
Streszczenie
„Demoniczne uwodzenie” to interpretacja Rękopisu..., w której na plan pierwszy 
wysuwają się postaci kobiece. Emina i Zubeida - uwodzicielki w sensie dosłownym - 
ucieleśniają również kuszącą niejednoznaczność epistemologicznych kategorii prawdy i 
fałszu. Owa niejednoznaczność zasadza się na poglądach Fryderyka Nietzschego, który, 
odwołując się do „niewieściej” metaforyki, proponuje zrewidowanie tradycyjnego 
spojrzenia na wartość poznawczą prawdy i kłamstwa. Te dwa kluczowe pojęcia, tak istotne 
dla ontologii świata przedstawionego Rękopisu..., przenikają się wzajemnie do tego 
stopnia, iż możemy w ich przypadku mówić nawet o wymienności funkcji. Emina i Zubeida 
to siostry bliźniaczki, których uwodzicielski urok i uderzające podobieństwo mają 
zasadnicze znaczenie dla zrozumienia istoty relacji prawda/fałsz (fakt/fikcja, historia/ 
zmyślenie) w całym powieściowym Universum.
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Leszek Drong
Une séduction démoniaque: pour une interprétation nietzschéenne de 
Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse de Jan Potocki
Résumé
„Une séduction démoniaque”, c’est une interprétation de Manuscrit... dans laquelle on 
met au premier plan les personnages féminins. Emine et Zubéide - séductrices au sens 
propre du terme - incarnent aussi une équivocité, elle-même séduisante, des catégories 
épistémologiques de vrai et de faux. Cette non-univocité relève des opinions de Friedrich 
Nietzsche qui, en recourant à la métaphorique „féminine”, propose de réviser la vision 
traditionnelle de la valeur épistémologique du vrai et du faux. Ces deux notions-clés, si 
importantes pour l’ontologie de l’univers représenté de Manuscrit..., s’interpénétrent au 
point que nous pouvons parler à propos d’elles d’interchangeabilité de fonctions. Emine et 
Zubéide sont deux soeurs jumelles dont le charme séducteur et la ressemblance, qui est en 
effet une identité, ont une importance capitale pour la compréhension de l’essence de la 
relation vrai/faux (fait/fiction, histoire/mensonge) dans tout l’univers romanesque de 
Potocki.
